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T he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the courts of appeals ad-
dressed the self-defense issue at length over the past year. In Dyson v.
tate1 the court of criminal appeals ruled on the extent to which the
person who instigates an altercation may use deadly force. Dyson was con-
victed of attempted voluntary manslaughter after the court denied his re-
quested instructions on the law of self-defense 2 and the use of deadly force. 3
The court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling4 on the basis
that Dyson intentionally provoked the difficulties with the victim.5 While
provocation is normally a question of fact and is included in the court's
charge as a limitation on self-defense, 6 the court indicated that the defend-
ant's intent was crucial in determining whether provocation had been estab-
lished as a matter of law.7 Dyson's testimony not only showed that he
initially provoked the fight, but also that he went home twice only to return
with a gun, that he shot his gun in the direction of his brother's refuge, and
that he held his father at gunpoint throughout the incident. This evidence
precluded any instruction on abandonment.8 Dyson's firing at two ap-
proaching police officers, whom he had mistaken for his brother, was, there-
fore, a continuation of the altercation that he had earlier provoked. 9
While a defendant's provocation of a fight precludes the issue of self-de-
fense,' 0 an unsupported charge on provocation will result in reversal."' In
* A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Grambling & Mounce, El Paso, Texas.
1. 672 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
2. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974), for the requirements for the use of
self-defense.
3. See id. § 9.32 (Vernon Supp. 1985), for the requirements for justifiable use of deadly
force.
4. 672 S.W.2d at 465.
5. Id. at 463.
6. Id; Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); see P. MCCLUNG,
JURY CHARGES FOR TEXAS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 330-34 (1983).
7. 672 S.W.2d at 464.
8. Id. at 465.
9. Id. at 462.
10. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (Vernon 1974).
11. Williamson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
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Williamson v. State12 the court of criminal appeals held that evidence that
the victim and defendant argued after the defendant told the victim to leave
his house did not justify a provocation issue.1 3 The court stated that a jury
should not be instructed on provoking the difficulty unless self-defense is an
issue and evidence shows that the deceased committed the first assault.' 4
Further, to have a pretext for inflicting bodily injury upon the deceased, the
defendant must have committed some act or used some words intended and
calculated to bring on the difficulty.' 5 While the evidence sufficiently justi-
fied a charge on the right of self-defense, the additional instruction on provo-
cation limited that right and required reversal. 16
Two other courts in the survey period addressed the propriety of in-
structing the jury on self-defense. In Bennett v. State'7 the Texarkana court
of appeals commented on instructing the jury on self-defense's and defense
of a third person 19 when the evidence only supported an instruction on self-
defense. The court ruled that the added instruction only served to confuse
the jury and improperly limited defendant's right to self-defense. 20 On the
other hand, in Romero v. State2' the Houston court held that failure to in-
struct the jury on the use of deadly force limited the right of self-defense
available to a potential rape victim. 22 The trial court instructed the jury on
the law of self-defense, but did not submit the requested instruction on the
use of deadly force.23
Evidence requiring an instruction on self-defense 24 may preclude submis-
sion of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter 25 in a murder prosecu-
tion.26 In Oliva v. State27 the Corpus Christi court of appeals distinguished
the elements of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter; the latter requires
that the defendant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion
arising from an adequate cause.28 Fear alone is insufficient to show sudden
passion, although terror may be "sufficient to render the mind incapable of
cool reflection."'29 The evidence reflected that Oliva, the victim, and several
12. 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex, Crim. App. 1984).
13. Id. at 487.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 486.
16. Id. at 487; see Stanley v. State, 625 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
17. 673 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, pet. granted).
18. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974).
19. See id. § 9.33, for the requirements of defense of a third person.
20. 673 S.W.2d at 397.
21. 663 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. refd).
22. Id. at 122.
23. Id. The trial court apparently submitted two and one-half pages of instructions to the
jury on the law of self-defense without instructing the jury that TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 9.32(3)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1985) authorized the use of deadly force to prevent the imminent
commission of rape or aggravated rape.
24. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31, .32 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1985) (§ 9.32
amended 1983).
25. See id. § 19.04 (Vernon 1974), for the elements of voluntary manslaughter.
26. Oliva v. State, 663 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
27. 663 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
28. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1974).
29. Id. § 19.04(c). For a discussion of the differences between fear and terror, see Daniels
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others were using cocaine and drinking liquor late one night. Oliva testified
that the victim bragged about previously shooting someone and that the vic-
tim ultimately threatened him. The victim pulled out a gun, a struggle en-
sued, and a shot went off. Oliva obtained control of the pistol and fired at
the victim; Oliva, however, denied intending to kill him. After reviewing the
evidence, the court distinguished voluntary manslaughter and self-defense.30
The court found no evidence of acts by the deceased that instantaneously
enraged or terrorized the mind of the accused, but rather the appellant's
testimony, if believed, showed that he acted in self-defense.3 1 The deceased,
the court stated, was the one who acted with sudden passion.
3 2
In Williams v. State3 3 the El Paso court of appeals extended the right of
self-defense to property crimes. The defendant had been charged with crimi-
nal mischief34 arising from a fight between rival factions of a janitorial crew.
The defendant and his compatriots were armed with pipes when they moved
into a parking lot to face the rival group. After hearing discussion concern-
ing a gun, the defendant attacked several individuals whom he thought were
trying to get a gun. One of these individuals got into a car and tried to run
over the defendant, but got stuck on an embankment. Unaware that the
vehicle was immobilized, the defendant beat it with his pipe out of rage and
a concern for his personal safety. The trial court denied defendant's re-
quested instruction on self-defense. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that self-defense is an available defense in property crimes involving force.3 5
The court distinguished Johnson v. State,3 6 because the offense alleged in
that case was carrying a handgun on premises licensed for the sale of alco-
holic beverages.37 The court of criminal appeals in Johnson held that the
necessity defense3 8 was available, but an instruction on self-defense was inap-
v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). While fear alone is not sudden passion,
"heated words" may be sufficient to show sudden passion. Ortiz v. State, 577 S.W.2d 246, 250
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
30. 663 S.W.2d at 658.
31. Id. at 659.
32. Id. at 659; cf. Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (fear of
death insufficient to warrant sudden passion); Lucky v. State, 495 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973) (victim's familiarity with defendant's wife sufficient for sudden passion require-
ment); McGee v. State, 473 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (threats insufficient to
constitute sudden passion).
33. 671 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no pet.).
34. Under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985) a person commits crim-
inal mischief when, without consent of the owner, he intentionally or knowingly damages the
owner's property or tampers with property and causes pecuniary loss or inconvenience.
35. 671 S.W.2d at 706.
36. 638 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982), affid, 650 S.W.2d 414 (Tex Crim. App.
1983). The defendant in Johnson, after having problems with the victim during a dice game
and while aware that the victim carried a loaded pistol and shotgun, borrowed a pistol from his
girlfriend after entering a bar in which the victim was drinking. A fight ensued, the victim was
killed, and several bar patrons were injured. The defendant was charged with unlawfully car-
rying a handgun on premises licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages, in violation of TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02(c) (Vernon 1974).
37. 671 S.W.2d at 705-06.
38. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974). The necessity defense is available
when the actor reasonably believes that his conduct is necessary to avoid harm and avoidance
of that harm outweighs the harm sought to be prevented by law. Id.
1985]
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propriate.3 9 Johnson involved a passive, completed offense separate and
apart from the altercation, 4° whereas Williams concerned defensive actions
in direct response to an attack, and the actions constituted the elements of
the alleged offense. 41
B. Necessity
In Johnson the court of criminal appeals extended the necessity defense
42
to carrying a handgun onto premises licensed for selling alcoholic bever-
ages. 43 During the past year the court further extended its application to
situations normally addressed by the right of self-defense. In Thomas v.
State44 the court of criminal appeals held that the necessity defense applied
to aggravated robbery.45 A police officer was beaten, and his pistol, flash-
light, and shotgun were taken. The defendant testified that the officer hit
him in the head without provocation. The officer then drew his gun, and the
defendant and his brother struggled to take it. The court reasoned that the
defendant's testimony raised the issue of necessity46 since the harm was im-
minent, avoiding death or injury outweighed the harm caused by the theft of
the officer's gun, and no apparent legislative purpose would exclude the justi-
fication under the circumstances. 4 7 As a result of this opinion and because
the language of the necessity defense is so general, practitioners should re-
quest an instruction on necessity when virtually any other offense would also
be applicable. Unless the court of criminal appeals or the legislature severely
limits the scope of section 9.22 of the Penal Code,48 this section should apply
in any case in which evidence of justification is presented.
C. Renunciation
The Dallas court clearly stated the elements of the renunciation defense 49
in Chennault v. State.50 Although the discussion centered on the prosecu-
tor's closing argument rather than an instruction to the jury, the court dis-
cussed the defense at length. The mere fact that completion of the offense
39. 650 S.W.2d at 416.
40. Id.
41. 671 S.W.2d at 706.
42. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
43. 650 S.W.2d at 414.
44. 678 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
45. Id. at 84-85.
46. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974) (footnote omitted) provides that:
Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to
avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, ac-
cording to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be pre-
vented by the law prescribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct
does not otherwise plainly appear.
47. 678 S.W.2d at 84.
48. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
49. See id. § 15.04.
50. 667 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, pet. refd).
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becomes more difficult or apprehension becomes more likely, as a result of
circumstances not present or apparent at its inception, and the offense is
thereby abandoned, will not constitute renunciation.5 1 In Chennault the de-
fendant feared that he had been set up or "spotted to the police" and at-
tempted to back out of his agreement with the undercover officer/hit man.
The court held that the defendant's actions did not constitute renuncia-
tion.12 Penal Code sections 15.04(c)(1) and (2)5 3 are not the only possible
means of involuntary, and thereby ineffective, renunciation. 54 The court
adopted the practice commentary of Penal Code section 15.0455 in holding
that the intent of the statute requires repentance or a change of heart before
a renunciation is voluntary. 6
D. Mistake of Fact
In Knowles v. State5 7 a bondsman was arrested, charged, and convicted of
theft of bond money over $200 and under $10,000.58 Knowles contended
that he received the payment from a Mrs. Griffith to be used against a bond
for a prospective client from Virginia. When the bondsman appeared at the
sheriff's office to post the bond, he learned of another $10,000 bond from
Maryland. The sheriff's office's records did not reflect that the Virginia bond
was ever posted, while Knowles's business records reflected that it was
posted. The court denied his requested charge to the jury on mistake of
fact 59 and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Knowles's failure to
testify specifically that the bond was posted precluded an issue on mistake of
fact. The court of criminal appeals reversed and held that the defendant's
business records adequately established his mistaken opinion that the bond
was posted, that he remained liable, and, if the jury believed the records, that
he was entitled to the money received. 6° The defendant was, therefore, enti-
tled to a charge on mistake of fact. 61
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04(c)(1) (Vernon 1974).
52. 667 S.W.2d at 303.
53. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.04(c)(1), (2) (Vernon 1974) provide that:
(c) Renunciation is not voluntary if it is motivated in whole or in part:
(1) by circumstances not present or apparent at the inception of the ac-
tor's course of conduct that increase the probability of detection or apprehen-
sion or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the objective; or
(2) by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to trans-
fer the criminal act to another but similar objective or victim.
54. 667 S.W.2d at 304.
55. Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon
1974).
56. 667 S.W.2d at 304. Under the facts of this attempted murder-for-hire case, the court
stated that if the defendant had a reason for the renunciation other than not wanting the victim
dead, then the renunciation would be involuntary and, therefore, ineffectual. Id.
57. 672 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
58. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
59. See id. § 8.02 (Vernon 1974). A defendant may raise the mistake of fact defense when
he formed a reasonable belief, by mistake, about a matter of fact and that mistaken belief
negates the required culpability for the crime. Id.





In Witherspoon v. State62 the defense counsel advanced a rather unique
contention when faced with a charge of burglary of a habitation with intent
to commit rape. 63 The trial court instructed the jury that voluntary intoxica-
tion did not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime. 64 On appeal
the defendant contended that he could not have had the specific criminal
intent to commit rape since he was too intoxicated on alcohol and various
types of drugs. The court held that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to
a crime requiring specific intent.65
II. PRESUMPTIONS
A. Obscenity
The court of criminal appeals expanded upon its earlier opinions 66 regard-
ing the constitutionality of Penal Code section 43.23(e) and ().67 The first
major obscenity opinion of the year, however, sidestepped the issue. In
Judge Clinton's opinion in Goodman v. State68 the court held that no ra-
tional trier of fact could have found that two ticket sellers had promoted
obscene films merely by exhibiting them.69 The court specifically stated that
persons who merely sell tickets behind a counter are not exhibiting a film. 70
The court opined, therefore, that if the ticket sellers did not exhibit the films,
they certainly can not be adjudged guilty of promoting them.71
The court, however, did address the constitutional issues in Shealy v.
State.72 The defendant, a store clerk at an adult bookstore, sold an allegedly
obscene magazine to an undercover Houston police officer. The court of
appeals reversed the conviction due to an improper jury instruction whereby
62. 671 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.).
63. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(d)(1) (Vernon 1974).
64. See id. § 8.04(a).
65. 671 S.W.2d at 144.
66. Davis v. State, 658 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (court considered constitu-
tionality of statutory presumption that possessor of obscene material has knowledge of its
content); Skinner v. State, 652 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (court held evidence insuffi-
cient to convict despite statutory presumption). See Schmolesky, Criminal Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 497, 511-16 (1984), for a discussion of these cases.
67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.23(e), (f) (Vernon Supp. 1985) provide that:
(e) A person who promotes or wholesale promotes obscene material or an ob-
scene device or possesses the same with intent to promote or wholesale pro-
mote it in the course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of
its content and character.
(f) A person who possesses six or more obscene devices or identical or similar
obscene articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote the
same.
These statutory sections must be read in conjunction with id. § 2.05 (Vernon 1974), which sets
forth the consequences of a presumption under Texas criminal law.
68. 667 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
69. Id. at 137.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Knighton v. State, 666 S.W.2d 386, 388-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd) (proof that defendant sold tickets was insufficient to establish guilt).
72. 675 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
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the defendant was presumed by statute to have knowledge of the content and
character of the promoted material. 73 The court, however, failed to deter-
mine whether the error was harmless. 74 The court of criminal appeals held
that the mere fact that the clerk sold the magazine and must have seen the
allegedly objectionable cover established neither that the content of the mag-
azine was obscene nor that the clerk was aware of the content. 75 The jury
could invoke the presumption of knowledge of the material's contents76 and
find the defendant guilty solely by finding that she sold the magazine to the
officer. 77 The court concluded that harmless error can never exist when the
first amendment to the United States Constitution78 and article 1, section 8
of the Texas Constitution 79 protect the promoted material and the trial court
instructs the jury that the prosecution may establish through the use of the
statutory presumption that the accused had knowledge of the content and
character of the promoted material.8 0 A jury charge on the presumption in
any case would constitute reversible error when either the first amendment
or the Texas Constitution protects the allegedly obscene material.81 The
court of criminal appeals' final decision in Hoyle v. State8 2 and an earlier
court of appeals decision in Kramer v. State8 3 support this reasoning.
B. Burglary
In Roberts v. State8 4 the Fort Worth court of appeals struck down as un-
constitutional the long standing Texas rule that unexplained possession of
recently stolen property invokes a presumption or inference of guilt in a
prosecution for burglary.8 5 The trial court had charged the jury that:
A presumption of a defendant's guilt of a burglary sufficient to sustain a
73. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
74. See Hall v. State, 661 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex Crim. App. 1983), wherein the majority
held that if the evidence is sufficient to prove culpability without applying the presumption, the
error is harmless.
75. 675 S.W.2d at 216.
76. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
77. 675 S.W.2d at 217.
78. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
79. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. 675 S.W.2d at 217.
81. Id. The future legal battleground may be the limits to which either the federal or state
constitution allegedly protects obscene material. Under the court's reasoning, if the material
were not protected, use of the presumption would not necessarily be error.
82. 672 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The court of criminal appeals originally
decided this case on December 2, 1983, and held that the § 43.23(e) presumption had been
unconstitutionally applied. On February 22, 1984, the court withdrew the opinion and de-
cided that the presumption was not necessary to support the conviction and such error was,
therefore, harmless. On May 23, 1984, the defendant sought a stay of the court's mandate to
petition the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. The court of criminal appeals
reversed its February decision, however, and issued the present opinion in its place.
83. 661 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd).
84. 672 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no pet.).
85. Id. at 580; see Walden v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 196, 198, 305 S.W.2d 354, 355-56
(1957). But see Scott v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 11, 13, 36 S.W. 276, 277 (1896), in which the
court held that the jury might be authorized to convict, in a proper case, upon the single fact of
possession of recently stolen property, but a charge to the jury that they could do so would be
a charge upon the weight of the testimony.
1985]
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conviction may arise from a defendant's possession of property stolen or
taken in a recent burglary. However, in the prosecution for burglary, to
warrant such an inference or presumption of guilt from the circum-
stances of possession alone, such possession must be personal, must be
recent, must be unexplained, and must involve a distinct and conscious
assertion of right to the property by a defendant. 86
The court of appeals extensively reviewed the law concerning the pre-
sumption/inference of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen
property87 and concluded that the trial court can make no proper jury
charge thereon.8 8 The court stated that when the court instructs the jury
that it may presume guilt from certain facts alone, that instruction is ines-
capably a comment on the weight of the evidence and removes from the
defendant any hope he may have to require the state to produce the evidence
of his guilt.8 9 The court concluded that unexplained possession of recently
stolen property may only be considered a circumstance of guilt to be applied
in determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal and that the jury
should never be instructed on the inference or presumption of guilt.90
III. SPECIFIC PENAL CODE PROVISIONS
A. Burglary-Intent
In Robles v. State91 the court of criminal appeals addressed the intent re-
quirement for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. Robles
allegedly forced his way into the home of Richard Merrill, president of First
City National Bank. Once inside, Robles played a tape recording explaining
that he was part of a group and that Mr. Merrill would be taken to the bank
to withdraw a sum of money. While the tape played, Mrs. Merrill called the
police and Robles was arrested. The court concluded that the evidence
clearly showed that the defendant entered the habitation with the intent to
obtain money from First City National Bank. 92 The question then became
whether the requisite intent for burglary with intent to commit theft93 is an
intent to appropriate property from within the burglarized premises. The
court held that the burglary statute94 does not require an intent to steal
property from within the burglarized premises and that the state need only
prove that the unlawful entry was made to further the commission of a
theft.95 The court did not hold that an entry with intent to commit a wholly
unconnected theft would be sufficient, but that the entry and theft in this
86. 672 S.W.2d at 577-78.
87. Id. at 578-80.
88. Id. at 579.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 580; see Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (jury may
draw an inference of guilt, but can not presume it).
91. 664 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 92.
93. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974), which states the elements for the
commission of a burglary.
94. Id.
95. 664 S.W.2d at 94.
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case were sufficiently interconnected to support a guilty verdict. 96
B. Theft and Related Offenses
In Sanders v. State97 the court of criminal appeals determined that misde-
meanor theft of property worth five dollars or more but less than twenty
dollars98 is not a lesser included offense of theft from a person. 99 The Code
of Criminal Procedure states that a lesser included offense occurs if "it dif-
fers from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or
risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suffices to es-
tablish its commission.' °° On original submission the court held that the
misdemeanor offense was a lesser included offense since the only difference
was a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person. 101 The court
ruled on rehearing that value must be shown for the lesser offense while none
is necessary for theft from a person. 102 Misdemeanor theft was not, there-
fore, a lesser included offense.
In Ortega v. State'013 the court of criminal appeals limited the definition of
services' °4 contained in the credit card abuse statute. 10 5 The defendant al-
legedly intentionally and knowingly used a Sears credit card fraudulently to
obtain property and services, knowing that the cardholder had not consented
to its use. While the services of the Sears clerk in extending credit were
"labor," the labor was not the desire of the defendant's transaction.10 6 The
court held that the extension of credit did not in and of itself constitute a
service as defined.10 7 Since the indictment alleged "property and services,"
the proof was insufficient and an acquittal was entered.' 0 8
C. Capital Murder and Murder
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the court of
criminal appeals both addressed the impact of Enmund v. Florida'0 9 on the
96. Id.
97. 664 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Crim. App, 1984).
98. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
99. 664 S.W.2d at 708-09; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(4)(B) (Vernon 1974).
100. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(2) (Vernon 1979).
101. 664 S.W.2d at 707.
102. Id. at 709. Compare Judge Clinton's dissenting opinion in Sanders, in which he re-
viewed the elements of theft and determined that value was not an element. Judge Clinton
reasoned, therefore, that misdemeanor theft should be considered a lesser included offense of
theft from a person. Id. at 712 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
103. 668 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
104. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(7) (Vernon 1974) (service includes labor and
professional service, utility, transportation, lodging, restaurant, entertainment, and property
rental).
105. Id. § 32.31 (Vernon 1974).
106. 668 S.W.2d at 706.
107. Id. The court pointed out that if clothing had been purchased and tailoring altera-
tions sought as well, then the defendant would have obtained both property and services as
alleged. Id.
108. Id. at 707.
109. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund the United States Supreme Court held that the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited imposition of the death pen-
1985]
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Texas death penalty statutes. 110 In Skillern v. Estelle"'I the Fifth Circuit
held that Enmund merely limited application of the death penalty to those
defendants who intended or contemplated that the intended offense would
result in a death. 112  The court specifically held that an accused may be
convicted of capital murder 1 3 under the Texas law of parties and criminal
responsibility1 4 even though the killing occurred in the course of an offense
that the defendant did not intend."15 As capital murder is not automatically
punishable by death,"16 the law of criminal responsibility may be constitu-
tionally applied. 17 The court held that the first question posed to the jury at
sentencing, whether the defendant's conduct that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result," 8 sufficiently directed the
jury to consider the defendant's conduct.' '9 The court stated, however, that
an additional instruction that the Texas law of criminal responsibility could
not supply the requisite intent, as well as an instruction requiring that the
nontriggerman defendant have had a reasonable expectation that death
would result, would be preferable.' 20 Since none was requested, the error
was not preserved. 12
In Kelly v. State 22 the court of criminal appeals held that Enmund did
not mandate that the defendant specifically intend to kill the victim named
in the indictment. 123 Kelly also imposed the death penalty upon a defendant
who "anticipates and contemplates that life will be taken or that lethal force
will be employed."' 24 The court also hinted that the law of criminal respon-
sibility could provide the intent requirement of the first punishment
alty on a nontriggerman defendant, who was waiting outside the victims' home and was appar-
ently unaware of the plan to rob and murder the victim, absent proof that he killed, attempted
to kill, or intended or contemplated that life would be taken. Id. at 801.
110. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 19.03(a) states that a person commits capital
murder if he (1) murders a police officer or fireman who was in the line of duty; (2) commits
murder in the course of kidnapping, burglary, rape, or arson; (3) commits murder for remuner-
ation; (4) commits murder while escaping from a penal institution; or (5) commits murder
while incarcerated in a penal institution. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp.
1985).
111. 720 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 846.
113. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
114. See id. §§ 7.01, .02 (Vernon 1974).
115. 720 F.2d at 846.
116. The sentence is either life imprisonment or death, depending upon the jury's answers
to the three questions set forth in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp.
1985).
117. 720 F.2d at 847.
118. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
119. 720 F.2d at 848.
120. Id; cf Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 773-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (trial court has
wide discretion in admitting or excluding evidence at punishment phase).
121. 720 F.2d at 848.
122. 669 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).





The court of criminal appeals changed the law of felony-murder during
the survey period in Murphy v. State.126 Prior to 1984, courts had always
followed the merger doctrine that prohibited conviction for felony-murder if
the same act that constituted the underlying felony offense caused the death
of the victim. 127 While paying lip service to the merger doctrine, 128 the ma-
jority in Murphy held that the underlying felony of arson 129 and the fire that
killed the deceased were somehow separate events. 130 The court stated that
the defendant's setting a habitation on fire and the resulting homicide were
not one and the same, because the appellant attempted to destroy a house to
collect the insurance money, which is a property offense, and in the further-
ance of this offense the deceased was killed.131
D. Forgery
The Dallas court of appeals in McGee v. State132 greatly extended the defi-
nition of "pass" as used in forgery statutes. 133 The court of appeals, citing
dicta in an earlier case,' 34 held that pass does not mean a "completed
pass."' 135 The defendant contended on appeal that the pass was incomplete
since the cashier did not accept the altered money order. The court held
that pass means to offer the forged instrument and does not require a show-
ing that the defendant actually received consideration in exchange. 136 The
question will ultimately become one of degree. If an individual attempts to
pass a forged instrument and the cashier refuses to take it,137 will a pass still
have occurred? If so, is attempted forgery by passing the instrument an of-
fense chargeable under the laws of the state of Texas?
125. Id. at 724 n.6.
126. 665 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1984) (felony murder statute).
127. See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (merger doctrine
is an exception to the felony murder rule and states that the underlying assault and the act
resulting in murder are one and the same)'
128. 665 S.W.2d at 119. Judge Teague clearly sets out the doctrine in his dissent. Id. at
120 (Teague, J., dissenting).
129. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (arson is committed when
a person starts a fire or causes an explosion without the owner's consent and with intent to
destroy the building).
130. 665 S.W.2d at 119.
131. Id.
132. 667 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no pet.).
133. Id. at 295-96; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21 (Vernon 1974) (stating that
"forge" means to, among other things, pass a writing that is forged).
134. Landry v. State, 583 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating that "pass"
means to offer the forged instrument and does not require a showing that the defendant actu-
ally received consideration).
135. 667 S.W.2d at 296.
136. Id.
137. In McGee the defendant passed the forged instrument to a cashier at a local credit
union. Upon noticing that the numerals were different, the cashier presented the check to a
supervisor. At that time the defendant was seen hurrying out of the credit union.
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E. False Report to a Peace Officer
The court of criminal appeals in McGee v. State1 38 addressed the extent to
which an individual can be prosecuted for filing a claim of police miscon-
duct. The defendant, who had been arrested for driving while intoxicated,
signed a sworn affidavit that a Dallas police officer accosted him. The officer
testified that he accidentally struck the defendant in the forehead with his
clipboard in trying to remove the defendant from his van. The defendant
stated that the officer pushed him against a police car, hit him in the stom-
ach and chest four or five times, hit him in the head with a flashlight, and
choked him. The officer who took the affidavit admitted to scratching out
some of the defendant's original words and that the defendant had not sup-
plied all the written material used in the affidavit. Moreover, a physician
testified that a blow from a blunt instrument like a flashlight, and not a
clipboard, had probably caused the knot on the defendant's head. Although
the defendant testified that the officer had beaten him both at the scene of the
arrest and at the police station, his affidavit reflected that the altercation
occurred at the scene of the arrest.1 39
Because the prosecution in this case resulted from an allegedly false claim
of police misconduct, it had to be reconciled with the rights of assembly,
petition, and redress of grievances.' 4° This requirement gave the state a
greater burden of proof.141 The state must prove that the defendant made
the statements in bad faith and not to obtain action on a valid grievance.
The state's evidence must not only show what happened and the defendant's
opportunity to perceive those facts, but also that the defendant perceived the
facts as they existed. 142 The court held that the evidence in this case fell far
short of the requisite level of proof. 143 Not only did the defendant's affidavit
closely parallel his testimony, but medical evidence and the officer's testi-
mony also supported portions of defendant's testimony. 44
The court of criminal appeals took a strong stand in favor of an individ-
ual's freedoms of petition and assembly in McGee. Deciding otherwise
under these facts would have drastically affected the filing of valid com-
138. 671 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
139. The defendant further testified that he had been awake for 35 hours when he signed
the affidavit and that the blow to the head had affected him.
140. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 27, which provides that: "The citizens shall have the right, in
a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good; and apply to those invested
with the powers of government for redress or grievances or other purposes, by petition, address
or remonstrance."
141. 671 S.W.2d at 895. If prosecutions under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.08 (Vernon
1974) do not involve reports of official misconduct, proving that the defendant knew that the
facts did not occur as reported would only require a showing that the defendant knew "that
the circumstances surrounding his conduct existed." 671 S.W.2d at 895. An inference arising
from proof of what actually happened together with proof of the defendant's opportunity to
observe what happened could show the defendant's culpable mental state. Id. at 895.
142. 671 S.W.2d at 895.
143. Id. at 896.
144. The court stated that the only major discrepancy was the scene of the alleged alterca-
tion. Id. at 895.
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plaints with the internal affairs divisions of local law enforcement agencies.
For this stand, the court is to be applauded.
F Gambling
The court of criminal appeals in Henderson v. State145 more clearly de-
fined gambling paraphernalia.146 Henderson was charged with possessing
"line sheets" on several professional football games. These sheets reflected
only the teams involved in each game and left space for the individual to fill
in the line on each game, which the defendant had done. No evidence was
presented that the defendant placed a bet on any of the games. The court
originally affirmed the conviction for possession of gambling parapherna-
lia, 147 but on rehearing adopted Judge Clinton's original dissent.148 The is-
sue in Henderson was whether a bettor to whom the line was communicated
committed an offense by noting the line numbers on a piece of paper and
putting it in his pocket. By reducing the line to writing for his own informa-
tion to help in deciding on which team he will place a bet, the court reasoned
that a putative bettor does not thereby create gambling paraphernalia, be-
cause in his hands the line sheets are not a means of carrying on bookmak-
ing. 149  With this opinion the court redirected the statute toward "the
exploitative gambler and his minions,"' 50 for whom it was intended.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL STATUTES
A. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code
In Wishnow v. State' 51 the court of criminal appeals struck down as un-
constitutionally vague the portion of the Alcoholic Beverage Code that pro-
hibited lewd and vulgar entertainment on the premises of a beer retailer.' 52
Alcoholic Beverage Code section 104.01(6) provides that no authorized beer
retailer may permit lewd or vulgar acts on the retailer's premises.' 53 This
statute is virtually identical to previous statutes held unconstitutional for the
same reasons.' 5 4 The court held that since the legislature did not define
"lewd or vulgar," the statute was impermissibly vague in describing acts of
entertainment that a beer retailer may not permit. 55
145. 661 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
146. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.01(5) (Vernon 1974), which defines gambling
paraphanelia as "any book, instrument, or apparatus by means of which bets have been or may
be recorded or registered; any record, ticket, certificate, bill, slip, token, writing, scratch sheet,
or other means of carrying on bookmaking, wagering pools, lotteries, numbers, policy, or simi-
lar games."
147. 661 S.W.2d at 724.
148. Id. at 726.
149. Id. at 725.
150. Id.
151. 671 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
152. Id. at 517; see TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 104.01(6) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
153. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 104.01(6) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
154. See Courtemanche v. State, 507 S.W.2d 545, 546-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Irven v.
State, 138 Tex. Crim. 368, 370, 136 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1940).




During the survey period two courts discussed the proof that is required
to support a conviction for misapplication of construction trust funds. 156 In
Gonzales v. State157 the Corpus Christi court of appeals set forth the ele-
ments of the offenses as follows: (1) a trustee who (2) directly or indirectly
with intent to defraud (3) retains, uses, disburses, misapplies, or otherwise
diverts (4) any trust funds (5) without first paying and satisfying all obliga-
tions of the trustee (6) to those the statute protects is guilty of misapplying
construction trust funds. 158 The question in Gonzales was the sufficiency of
the evidence to prove an intent to defraud, because unless a defendant con-
cedes his intent to defraud it must be proven circumstantially. The court
found proof of all the requisite elements except the intent to defraud because
the state presented no evidence of any false statement or deceptive prac-
tice. 159 The payment of a check to the subcontractor apparently was
stopped because of a dispute over whether it was in fact due. The court
reversed the conviction because these facts did not establish fraud. 16°
In another construction fraud case, McElroy v. State, 161 a sharply divided
Dallas court of appeals held that the state failed to show the necessary intent
to defraud. 162 Numerous exhibits reflected that the construction funds were
used for purposes other than labor, materials, or reasonable overhead on the
project. 163 The state, however, failed to show the balance on the defendant's
three checking accounts prior to the project and did not trace the source of
the funds from the project to other uses. The state also failed to show that
all deposits in the business accounts came from the project owners. The
state produced checks to payees that did not appear connected to the con-
struction project, but failed to show the ultimate disposition of those
funds.164 While the state must show that the defendant made payments for
purposes other than the construction project, it must also show an intent to
defraud.' 65 The court held that the state did not prove that the defendant
had given the proceeds to a person unauthorized to receive them. 166 The
state failed to prove that the payees received the money from the checks and
that they did not merely cash the defendant's checks and pay him the
156. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472(e) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (repealed 1983).
The statute has been re-enacted as part of the TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.033
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
157. 670 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.).
158. Id. at 415.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 667 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, pet. granted).
162. Id. at 862. Justice Storey wrote the majority opinion, in which two other justices
joined. Both Justice Akin and Justice Whitham filed concurring opinions, and both Justice
Guillot and Justice Sparling wrote dissenting opinions.
163. Id. at 860.
164. For instance, one check was written to B & B Liquor. The defendant testified that the
check was to cover his company's payroll checks cashed at the store.
165. Id.; see Construction Payments and Loan Receipts Act, ch. 323, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen.
Laws 770, repealed by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 576, 577.
166. 667 S.W.2d at 861.
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money. 167 The state must affirmatively prove that the contractor actually
applied the value of the check to a forbidden purpose, thus intending to
deprive subcontractors and materialmen of their compensation.168 The court
also held that the state must negate the statutory exception of legal over-
head, which it failed to do.169 A heavy burden is placed, therefore, on the
state170 in future prosecutions under this statute or its successors.1 71
167. Id. at 862.
168. Id. at 863.
169. Id.; see TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 2.02 (definition of an exception), 2.03 (defini-
tion of a defense) (Vernon 1974).
170. Justice Whitham, in his concurring opinion, expressed his view that TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5472(e) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (repealed 1983) was unconstitutionally vague
for failure to define "reasonable overhead" or "reasonable overhead directly related to such
construction contract." 667 S.W.2d at 868 (Whitham, J., concurring).
171. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.033 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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